|
An Upside Down View of Governance Published
by: Institute of Development Studies, Centre for the Future State 2010
University of Sussex ISBN: 978 1 85864 9137 Pages:83,
Price: Sterling Pound 14.95 Reviewed by: C. D. Bhatta,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung There has been plethora of writings
on "governance" over the years positing it as main mantra to speed-up
development and democratisation process particularly in the global South. At some
point, it appeared that the concept itself was simply rediscovered by the donors
whose major clients became countries of the global South. The discussion on governance
stole more limelight when majority of the newly democratised states suffered the
brunt of "intrastate conflicts" that ultimately led to the erosion in
the traditional power of the state. To restore power of the states, they were
repeatedly advised to improve on governance and were provided, one after another,
options by the donors. Nevertheless all these efforts failed to produce tangible
result and majority of the states fell apart. And reason cited, yet again, was
bad governance. But to our dismay, scholars, policy makers and donors have failed
to identify as what exactly is bad or good - governance. In contrast, they provided
ritualistic advices based on theoretical nuances and tried to replicate same policies
for all the states. They thought that what is good for the west is good for the
rest and what is good in theory would be good in practice as well. This
generates some fundamental questions as what governance is all about. Why plethora
of literature could not provide solutions to the problem that revolve around the
issues of governance. Before we answer these questions, let us dig out the history
of governance. The concept of governance itself is not a new and is as old as
human civilisations. We can find discussion about "governance", in one
way or the other, in all major religious literatures. For example, it has been
discussed broadly in Bhagvad Geeta, the Islamic Sharia provides comprehensive
governance rules and Christianity gives prime importance to the teachings of Jesus
Christ's management style. Governance has also been broadly discussed in Kautilaya's
Arthasasthra and used Plato, for the first time, in the politics of Greek city-state.
Likewise, Adam Smith argues that political state had to build institutions that
can ensure justice and security and political and civic culture that values ethical
standards. By and large, the whole idea of governance is to create democratic
and just society based on the interest and priorities of the people. Mick Moore
Professor of Governance at IDS, Sussex, defines governance process through which
states acquire and use their power and authority. For him, better governance comes
from strengthening the responsiveness of states to the needs of their citizens,
their accountability to citizens through rules-based mechanism which require them
to answer for their actions, and through which they can be rewarded or sanctioned;
and state capability - both political capability to determine needs and manage
competing interests, and bureaucratic capability to design and implement policy,
and enforce authority (IDS Policy Briefing Issue 34). If
governance, theoretically, is all about empowerment of people through responsive
states, why it has failed to deliver in the global south. Perhaps the time has
come to reflect as where and how we failed and IDS through its recent publication
"An Upside Down View of Governance" tries to answer some of these questions.
The book is the product of five year long research carried out by the Centre for
the Future State at the different parts of the world (from Sao Paulo to New Delhi).
The book asks policy makers to come out of the box, close off their mental models
of development, and look at what is actually happening in society and how it is
composed of. It attempts to offer new 'drawing skills' and explores an open-minded
way how elements of public authority are being created through complex processes
of bargaining between state and societal actors, and the interaction of formal
and informal institutions. It also suggests donors to change and discontinue recycling
policies and people as it does not bring people centered change. Donors over the
years in the recipient countries have simply promoted clientalism in society as
well as within the donor community in the name of good governance. The
central argument of the book is that instead of prioritising reform of formal
institutions, one should look at the structures, relationships, interests and
incentives that underpin them. It suggests that informal and traditional institutions
and personalised relationships should not be seen as governance problem but part
of the solution, because in many occasions modern and formal state institutions
are not accepted by the people - African states are case in point. It also argues
that traditional Weberian ideas of the state capacity (monopoly of violence, a
rules-based bureaucracy, and representative institutions, and clear distinctions
between public and private spheres) look out of date. That said, the process of
state-building alone is not enough to address problems brought about by the post-state
challenges. The authors argue that instead of 'state building' and 'state capacity',
think about creating 'public authority' i.e. institutions' (both formal and informal)
that can undertake core governance functions. For them, 'state building' tends
to evoke the historical experience of Western countries, notably France and Germany
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and thus may not be suitable in other
contexts. It goes on to argue that states are not the only sources of public authority.
Governments today have to negotiate with a much greater diversity of actors, including
an expanded private sector with transitional links. Also, in most poor countries
the boundaries between 'state' and 'society' is unclear and the task of organising
collective action to create public goods may be shared between state and non-state
actors. Taken together, it underlines the need of creating accountable and transparent
public authority by taking all the actors on board. The
book further argues that merely strengthening civil society, as done in the past,
will not benefit poor people primarily because civil societies are found to have
been strengthened merely to serve the interests of certain networks of actors
and power centres. And in many cases elites and, to some extent, donors are also
promoting their own civil society either merely to siphon off the fund or loath
their agendas.
When it comes to the point of state fragility, the book emphasis,
its not only the weak institutions and high level of corruption as enunciated,
it by contrast, is the lack of elite incentives to create effective public authority
or to accept the change. The book argues that weak governance and ongoing conflict
has provided more opportunities and benefits to the elites than the stable and
strong governance. Perhaps, this could be the reason among others, why elites
do not push for the timely resolution of the conflict in Nepal which becomes what
Garret Hardin terms tragedy for the commons. When it comes
to the point of creating effective and accountable public authority tax plays
the vital role, which has completely been sidelined in Nepali context. That tax
should not be seen just as fiscal issue but as a social fiscal contract between
state and citizens. But bear in mind, tax can only develop the desired 'contract'
when the state is dependent on citizens for tax and the tax collected is spent
for the benefit of citizens. Hence, the issue of tax should also be seen from
the accountable governance lense, underlines the book. There
are, however, problems with some of the suggestions provided in the book. For
example, it does not prioritise the agenda of state building but focuses more
on creating public authority. But the fact is that in a fragile state like Nepal
the inclusive public authority cannot be created in the absence of functional
state. Neither public authority can be drawn from the private sector nor through
informal approaches. The public authority that mostly stems from the urban elites
is sectoral and does not represent the real stakeholders of the society. This
will only result in security deficit for the citizens, albeit elites can protect
themselves by hiring private security forces who will not feel the need to organise
for the cause of security of citizenry at large. This is so because those who
wanted to change do not have the power and those who have the power do not want
change. This also is the question of who represents whom. In a country like Nepal
the desired power, wealth and capacity to implement change lies either with urban
centered elites (who do not understand the problems) or donors who are co-opted
by these very elites. Under these circumstances, there is no way that we can create
an accountable public authority envisioned in the book. This certainly is the
reason why Nepali citizens have failed to realise the change in real sense of
term despite number of successful regime changes over the years. Hence, the only
solution is to create the strong and functional state by adopting holistic approach
and can bring about positive changes into the life of people. Finally, the book
certainly could be good for the policy makers, donors and scholars as it provides
new perspectives on governance.
[Appeared in The Kathmandu Post, dated
22nd May, 2010) |
